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Abstract
This master thesis researches probabilistic description logics with the
aim of showing how the different probability interpretations are reflected
in the existing formalisms. As an integrated thesis in Mathematics and
Computer Science, this project focuses on the mathematical as well as the
conceptual differences between the different probability interpretations first
generally, then specifically in probabilistic description logics. Some decid-
ability issues are addressed as well. The thesis centers on one particular ar-
ticle by Tao et al. (2007) as the only one that uses the belief-type probability
for terminological axioms such as concept inclusions. Most other research
is focused on the frequency interpretation, which is perceived to be more
useful, since there is a simple method for acquiring the probability values.
The approach of Tao et al. is less popular for practical reasons, however, it
can help us fully understand the behaviour of probabilistic description log-
ics. It is my aim to critically investigate this article in detail, fill in the gaps
of their explanations and make it accessible for students of Mathematics and
Computer Science who are unfamiliar with this topic.
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1 Introduction
This thesis investigates the different approaches to probabilistic description logics.
Description logics are a family of logical representations which are simple enough
to allow a practical feasibility but complex enough to represent human knowledge
to some extent. Logical statements in description logics are of the form “A is
a B” or “C is related to D” or “every E is also an F.” Description logics offer
a particularly successful compromise between expressiveness and computational
complexity.
Description logic is closely related to modal logic, although while modal logic
is originally more theoretical and philosophical, description logic is rather more
practical. There is, moreover, intensive research about probabilistic description
logics, which is why it was chosen for this project.
In computer science an ontology is a conceptual structure for modelling do-
main knowledge and reasoning about it. An ontology is an abstract model of a
certain aspect of the real world. In the last decade, ontologies became popular
due to their role in the Semantic Web (Berners-Lee et al., 2001), their usage in
enterprise knowledge management systems (Uschold et al., 1998), medical ter-
minology systems (Stevens et al., 2002; Rector and Horrocks, 1997; Spackman,
2000), and biology (Wolstencroft et al., 2005; Bodenreider and Stevens, 2006).
One of the motivations for probabilistic description logic is the Semantic Web,
which is a future version of the world wide web aiming for more automatized
processes by incorporating machine understandable content into a website. It has
been decided by the W3C1 that machine understandable ontologies are to use the
Web Ontology Language, OWL, which is largely based on description logic.2
Until recently the importance of representing uncertainty and incomplete in-
formation in description logic has not been realized. Ontologies have so far con-
tained purely logical formalisms. However, now that research on probabilistic
and vague reasoning has reached a certain maturity, there is increased demand for
formalisms that can represent and reason with uncertain knowledge.
There are a number of ways of dealing with uncertain information in logic,
1World Wide Web Consortium, the international standards organization for the World Wide
Web.
2See http://www.w3.org/standards/semanticweb/.
1
most important of which are probabilistic logic and fuzzy logic. Both probabilistic
and fuzzy description logics are decidable (if the underlying logic is decidable).3
Decidability is an important property for computer science, since it is essential
that a program should terminate, and within a reasonable time. One of my aims
in this thesis is to understand more about the decidability of probabilistic logic.
The motivation for choosing probabilistic logic over fuzzy logic is the fact that
there are several different probabilistic description logics which brings about an
interesting discussion on the various probability interpretations.
There are several ways of adding probabilities to description logics, which
correspond to the several interpretations of probability itself. The statements “the
probability of rolling a six is p” and “the probability of my football team winning
tonight is q” are very different in the way of acquiring the values for p and q. In
the first case a simple calculation or several experiments lead us to a value of 1/6,
in the second case the probability is relative to our knowledge and it is possible
that different people will pick different probability values. As in real life, there
are also different ways of thinking about probability in description logics which
is reflected in research. In this project I endeavour to understand the differences
between the interpretations while focusing on one approach which is different
from the mainstream.
The most widespread approach, which I will call the “frequency” interpreta-
tion of probability, is more common seemingly due to its practical advantages.
Utilizing this approach are among others Jaeger (1994), Heinsohn (1994) and
Lukasiewicz (several papers, see References). The other interpretation, which
will be referred to as the “belief” model, is mainly used for assertions, which is
knowledge that concerns specific individuals. It is used alongside the frequency
model in the above-mentioned papers, and additionally in Du¨rig and Studer (2005)
and Lutz and Schro¨der (2010). There is so far one article, (Tao et al., 2007), which
uses the belief model for terminological knowledge, which is information about
the relation between sets. Lutz and Schro¨der (2010) mention this as a possible
future research topic for them which makes it an interesting subject to investigate.
In this project it is my aim to critically investigate the Tao et al. (2007) article,
fill in the gaps of their explanations and make it accessible to students of Math-
3See Bonatti and Tettamanzi (2006) on fuzzy description logics complexity.
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ematics and Computer Science who are unfamiliar with this topic. I am aiming
to use this article as a basis for the comparison of the two main probability types.
Furthermore, it is my goal to find out why there is so far only one research article
using this approach, and whether it has any advantages to the frequency model.
There are few articles that address the different probability interpretations in
regard to description logics, such as Klinov et al. (2009) and Lutz and Schro¨der
(2010), and while the former mainly analyzes one type of formalism (the P-SH-
type researched by Lukasiewicz), the latter creates their own probabilistic descrip-
tion logics. The extensive analysis of probability interpretations in description
logics presented in this thesis is quite unique. As a summary my goals and contri-
butions are:
• investigating the decidability of probabilistic logic;
• providing a conceptual analysis of the several existing probability interpre-
tations;
• understanding and explaining Tao et al. (2007) as it is the only advocate
of the belief-type probability in relation to terminological knowledge in de-
scription logics;
• comparing the two main probability interpretations (frequency and belief)
in relation to description logics;
• analyzing why the frequency approach is more common, and whether the
belief approach might have any advantages.
In the next chapter I will introduce description logics, basic probabilistic logic
and the various probability interpretations to give a background for later discus-
sions. A basic knowledge of propositional and first-order logic is assumed from
the reader, they are therefore not included in this report. In the third chapter I will
examine the Tao et al. (2007) paper in detail and in chapter 4 I will analyze the
two probability interpretations.
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2 Background
This chapter introduces the most important details about the background material
essential for this project. Firstly, we will look at (non-probabilistic) description
logic, then simple probabilistic propositional logic, and finally, the basic proba-
bility interpretations are considered.
2.1 Description Logics
Description logics are a family of knowledge representation formalisms closely
related to modal logic. They describe a domain of individuals, define concepts
on them, and link these individuals and concepts with relations and hierarchies.
The name description logics refers to a highly formalized logical framework. De-
scription logics have a higher expressive power than simple propositional logic,
however, the aim is to keep the complexity relatively low so the logic would still
be decidable. First-order logic has a higher expressive power, but is undecidable.
Therefore, description logics are the language of choice in many decision prob-
lems, and they will be the underlying formalism in this project as well.
Description logic is a good model for the way humans understand the world; it
allows the classification of concepts and individuals, linking them into conceptual
networks, and thus allowing us to reason about our chosen domain of interest.
The main areas of application of description logics are among others medical
ontologies (Baader et al., 2003, p.406), the semantic web (Baader et al., 2003,
p.427) and database query optimization (Baader et al., 2003, p.462).
Description logic is often mentioned in plural, and the reason for this is that
there are a large number of constructors that allow the buildup of complex con-
cepts and roles. The more of these constructors, the more expressive the language
becomes, but at the same time it can quickly become unreasonably long to eval-
uate certain queries, or it might even become undecidable (Baader et al., 2003,
p.44). Therefore, most projects choose just a few constructors that they consider
necessary. The next section will explain the basics of description logic and list the
most important constructors. From now on we will often abbreviate description
logic(s) to DL.
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The theory of DL is described by model theoretic syntax. This syntax then
can be mapped to first-order logic, thus giving us a formal semantics. Throughout
this chapter the syntax and semantics are going to be explained side by side with
a table summarizing the definitions in the end (see page 8).
The theory of DL consists of three distinct topics. The first one deals with
categorizing individuals into concepts and roles, which is called assertions. The
second one is the terminology, which describes relationships among the concepts
and roles. The third part is where the complexity of DL is determined by the
buildup of complex concepts and roles.
2.1.1 Assertions – ABox
The most basic aspect of DL is the “is-a” relationship. “Fido is a dog”, “Ted
is a father” are both assertions where Fido and Ted are individuals and dog and
father are concepts. In DL these can be written the following way: dog(FIDO),
father(TED). Concepts therefore act as unary predicates.
The other type of assertion is a role which is a binary predicate and exam-
ples are: has child(TED, ANNE), causes(FLU, HEADACHE), which mean Ted’s
child is Anne, and flu causes headache. The first object in the relation is the sub-
ject (or actor), while the second one is the object which is also called filler.
These above definitions are called assertions which means any kind of logical
sentence which characterizes a concrete individual. These have the general look
of the following statements in DL syntax:
C(a) or a : C
R(b, c) or (b, c) : R
Objects are usually represented by lowercase letters, and concepts and roles
with uppercase ones. Concepts can be thought of as unary predicates, roles as
binary predicates, and objects as constants. The above statements are contained
in a set called the Assertion Box, or ABox.
In order to define a semantics for description logics we need to consider in-
terpretations. An interpretation I = {∆I , ·I} consists of a domain (or world) ∆I
which is a set of all the individuals (and for all practical reasons nonempty), and
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an interpretation function (denoted with ·I) which maps atomic concepts to sub-
sets of ∆I and maps atomic roles to sets of ordered pairs from ∆I . So for every
atomic concept A there is a set AI ⊆ ∆I ; and for every atomic role R there is a
binary relation RI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I .
The interpretation function also maps every individual name a to an element
in the domain aI ∈ ∆I . The semantics of assertions of concepts and roles will be
the following:
C(a) : aI ∈ CI
R(b, c) : (bI , cI) ∈ RI
2.1.2 Terminology – TBox
Along with the ABox, there is also a TBox which stands for Terminological Box
which consists of the terminological axioms which represent knowledge of how
different concepts and roles are related to each other. In DL we can define two
relationships, and these are equality and inclusion.
C ≡ D (R ≡ S)
C v D (R v S)
where C, D are concepts and R, S are roles. This equivalence/inclusion model
classifies concepts (and roles) into hierarchies. The ABox and TBox together
make up the knowledge base.
In the formal theory an interpretation satisfies an inclusion C v D if CI ⊆
DI , and it satisfies an equality C ≡ D if CI = DI .
An equality whose left-hand side is an atomic concept and right-hand side is
a complex concept is a definition. The next section will explain how complex
concepts can be formed.
2.1.3 DL languages
So far we have talked about atomic concepts and atomic roles. It is possible to
create complex concepts. The most basic constructors specify a language called
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AL (attributive language) and are listed below. These constructors define con-
cepts, therefore – in spite of the sometimes confusing notation – they are to be
thought of as sets and can even be empty.
C,D −→ A | (atomic concept)
> | (top concept)
⊥ | (bottom concept)
¬A | (atomic negation)
C uD | (intersection)
∀R.C | (value restriction)
∃R.> (limited existential quantification)
In this list top concept describes every individual in the domain, whereas bot-
tom concept is an empty concept. InAL only atomic negation is allowed, and only
the top concept is allowed in the existential quantification. The formal semantics
of the above can be seen in Table 1 (page 8).
When we talk about description logics in plural, we mean the family of possi-
ble extensions to AL. The most basic extensions are the following:
U : C unionsqD (union of concepts)
E : ∃R.C (full existential quantification)
C : ¬C (negation of concepts)
N : ≤ nR (number restriction, at-least)
≥ nR (at-most)
If we decide to extend AL with some of these constructors, we name that
language by adding the appropriate letter after AL. So for instance if we have
AL extended with full existential quantification and number restriction, then we
call that language ALEN .
It is easy to verify that U and E together are equivalent to C (since we can
define union with the use of intersection and negation: C unionsq D ≡ ¬(¬C u ¬D);
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and we can describe existential quantification with negation and universal quan-
tification: ∃R.C ≡ ¬∀R.¬C). In fact, ALC is the basis of most description logic
models.
C(a) aI ∈ CI
R(b, c) (bI , cI) ∈ RI
C ≡ D CI = DI
C v D CI ⊆ DI
> ∆I
⊥ ∅
¬C ∆I \CI
C uD CI ∩DI
C unionsqD CI ∪DI
∀R.C {a ∈ ∆I∣∣ ∀b.(a, b) ∈ RI → b ∈ CI}
∃R.C {a ∈ ∆I∣∣ ∃b.(a, b) ∈ RI ∧ b ∈ CI}
Table 1: Summary of ALC semantics
2.1.4 Reasoning with Description Logics
After we have chosen a description logic language and defined our knowledge
base, the next task is to infer additional information from this knowledge base
(KB). This is referred to as reasoning, and Buchheit et al. (1993) identifies our
main reasoning tasks as follows:
1. KB-satisfiability: are an ABox and a TBox consistent with each other?
Does the KB admit a model, that is, is there an interpretation that satisfies
the knowledge base?
2. Concept satisfiability: given a KB and a concept C, does there exist at least
one model of the KB assigning a non-empty interpretation to C?
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3. Subsumption: given a KB and two concepts C and D, is C more general
thanD in any model of the KB? Subsumption detects implicit dependencies
among the concepts in the knowledge base.
4. Instance checking: given a KB, an individual a and a concept C, is a an
instance of C in any model of the KB?
Most importantly, a concept C is unsatisfiable if and only if CI is empty in
all models. This is one reason why the domain ∆I should be non-empty; with an
empty domain a concept C would be equivalent to its negation ¬C, thus making
C satisfiable and unsatisfiable at the same time.
2.2 Probabilistic reasoning
Before we discuss probabilistic reasoning in description logic let us look at prob-
abilistic logic in general. In probabilistic logic, a logical sentence is still true or
false but each sentence is associated with a real number between 0 and 1 which
represents the probability of that sentence. The term “probabilistic logic” was first
used by Nilsson (1986) and many still rely on his original work.
The probability of a logical sentence is made precise by the notion of possible
worlds. According to Nilsson (1986) this probabilistic generalization is applicable
to any logical system where satisfiability is decidable, such as description logic or
propositional logic. Go¨del’s completeness theorem states that consistency in first-
order logic (and in anything less expressive) is equivalent to satisfiability, therefore
this thesis will use these terms synonymously.
In basic probabilistic logic we start by defining our probabilistic formulas and
probabilistic knowledge bases. We define Φ as a set of independent basic events.
Φ = {p1, · · · , pn} with n ≥ 1 where each pi is a propositional symbol with a
possible true or false value. > and ⊥ will denote true and false. We define events,
where every element of Φ ∪ {>,⊥} is an event, and furthermore if φ and ψ are
events, then so is ¬φ, (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ) and (φ→ ψ). We denote the set of events
with Φ. In practical examples we are usually only interested in a subset of Φ
which can be denoted with Φ̂.
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A world I is a function which maps every basic sentence in Φ to a truth value.
IΦ denotes the set of all worlds. We extend I by induction to all events in Φ.
This means that when I(φ) is true, then I(¬φ) is false and vice versa; if we have
I(φ ∧ ψ), then it is true if and only if I(φ) and I(ψ) are both true; and thirdly
if we have I(φ ∨ ψ), then it is true if I(φ) or I(ψ) is true or both. This step
does not change the number of worlds in IΦ since we do not consider “illegal”
combinations (e.g. when I(φ) = true and I(ψ) = true, then I(φ ∧ ψ) cannot
equal false). A world I satisfies an event φ, or I is a model of φ, denoted I |= φ,
if and only if I(φ) = true.
A probability distribution Pr is defined on IΦ which by definition maps every
I ∈ IΦ to a number in [0, 1] such that
∑
I∈IΦ Pr(I) = 1. The probability of an
event φ denoted Pr(φ) is the sum of all Pr(I) where I |= φ.
As a simple example (from Nilsson (1986)) imagine that there is one logical
sentence in Φ, let’s call it S. S can be either true or false, so we can imagine two
worlds I1 and I2, one in which S is true and one in which S is false. To model our
uncertainty about the actual world, we can assign probabilities to each possible
world. The probability that S is in I1 is Pr(I1) and the probability that S is in I2
is Pr(I2) = 1− Pr(I1). Then the probability of S being true is Pr(I1).
If we have L basic sentences, we have exactly 2L possible worlds in IΦ. As
an example, let us look at the following sentences:
Φ̂ = {P, P → Q,Q}
There are four possible sets of values for these events, since the set of basic sen-
tences Φ = {P,Q} contains two elements and that makes 22 possible worlds.
P true true false false
P → Q true false true true
Q true false true false
The four possible worlds can be expressed with a vector notation where we keep
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the order of the sentences from the list Φ̂:
I1 =
11
1
 , I2 =
10
0
 , I3 =
01
1
 , I4 =
01
0

where 0 stands for false and 1 stands for true as usual. The probability function
Pr is a probability distribution on these possible worlds such that
∑
Pr(Ii) = 1
by definition. The reason why we let the probabilities sum to one is because
these possible worlds are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The probability of a
sentence in Φ̂ is taken as the sum of the probabilities of those worlds where that
sentence is true. This could be easier seen in a matrix equation form where we put
the possible worlds into a matrix W with the Ii as columns. The probability of
each world is then a column vector P and the probability of each logical sentence
is a vector Π.
WP = Π1 1 0 01 0 1 1
1 0 1 0


Pr(I1)
Pr(I2)
Pr(I3)
Pr(I4)
 =
 Pr(P )Pr(P → Q)
Pr(Q)

2.2.1 Probabilistic entailment
A probabilistic formula F is an expression of the form φ ≥ l where φ is an event
and l ∈ [0, 1]. This means that the probability of an event φ is at least l. To encode
an upper bound we can simply say “¬φ ≥ 1 − u” which is equivalent to saying
that the probability of φ is at most u. A probabilistic knowledge base K is a finite
set of probabilistic formulas.
A probability distribution function Pr satisfies (or is a model of ) a probabilistic
formula φ ≥ l if and only if Pr(φ) ≥ l. Pr satisfies (or is a model of) a knowledge
base K if and only if Pr satisfies all F ∈ K. K is satisfiable if and only if a model
of K exists. A probabilistic formula F is a logical consequence of K (K |= F )
if and only if every model of K satisfies F . A probabilistic formula φ ≥ l is a
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tight logical consequence of K if and only if l is the infimum of Pr(φ) over all the
models Pr of K (Lukasiewicz and Straccia, 2008, p.293).
The main decision and optimization problems in probabilistic logic are de-
ciding the satisfiability of probabilistic knowledge bases, finding logical conse-
quences and computing tight logical consequences.
One can ask why the formula sets upper and lower bounds for the probabil-
ity instead of specifying a distinct value. We can only speculate the answer, but
firstly, it is easy to attain a concrete probability by equating the lower and up-
per bounds, and secondly, there is a practical advantage to having an additional
layer of uncertainty. Our informations about probabilities might be conflicting, or
coming from different agents. Nilsson (1986) (for propositional logic) as well as
Jaeger (1994) (for description logics) both describe algorithms for calculating the
probabilities of statements newly added to the knowledge base, the result of which
is a probability interval rather than a specific value. Lukasiewicz in his research
uses non-monotonic logic which allows new information to reduce the knowledge
that we already have, which might even result in a lower and upper probability of
0 and 1. All in all, it seems far more useful to have probability intervals rather
than fixed values. The question is whether this theory is decidable, and the next
section will deal with that.
2.2.2 Decidability
In propositional logic, if a logical sentence is satisfiable, then it is possible to find
values for every variable so that the sentence evaluates to true. If there is no such
assignment of values, then the sentence is unsatisfiable which in propositional
logic is also called an absurdity since it always evaluates to false. Thus, satisfiable
sentences are those that are not absurdities. Satisfiability in propositional logic is
also decidable, with truth tables being an effective algorithm. In probabilistic logic
we can talk about the satisfiability of a probabilistic formula, or the satisfiability
of a knowledge base with regard to the probability distribution. The next theorem
is a claim about the satisfiability of a probabilistic formula.
We intend to prove that a propositional formula φ has a model if and only if the
probabilistic formula φ ≥ l with l > 0 also has a model. A probabilistic formula
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F of the form φ ≥ l is satisfiable if and only if there exists a function Pr such
that Pr(φ) ≥ l.
Let us first look at the case of l = 0. In this case Pr(φ) ≥ 0, and this is true
for any probabilistic interpretation Pr. Therefore it is not generally true that if
a probabilistic formula has a model, then the propositional formula has one too.
This is only true if l > 0, and we consider this in the following.
Theorem 1. Probabilistic satisfiability (with l > 0) is equivalent to propositional
satisfiability.
Proof. First we prove that a satisfiable propositional formula implies a satisfiable
probabilistic formula.
Let I be a model for φ. The probability of φ is the sum of all the probabilities
of those worlds Ii that model φ. Since I |= φ, we can set Pr(I) = 1 and then Pr
will be a model for F .
Next, let us consider the other side of the bi-implication: if Pr is a model for
φ ≥ l, then ∃I such that I is a model for φ. Let Pr be a model for φ ≥ l. Since
l > 0, Pr(φ) > 0. Pr(φ) is the sum of Pr(Ii) over all worlds Ii where φ is true.
Since
∑
Pr(Ii) > 0, there has to exist at least one world I where I models φ
and Pr(I) > 0. This proves the equivalence of the propositional and probabilistic
satisfiability.
Corollary 1. In case of propositional events the satisfiability of a probabilistic
formula is decidable.
In logic, a decision problem is decidable if there exists an effective method to
answer it. Decision problems are yes-no questions, and an effective method is an
algorithm that always gives an answer, always gives the right answer, and does
it in finite time. Propositional satisfiability is decidable, and truth tables are an
effective algorithm.
In the previous theorem we showed that in a probabilistic formula φ ≥ l, if
l = 0 then the formula is satisfiable regardless of the event φ. If l > 0, then
since the satisfiability of φ is decidable, we can always tell whether a model I
exists for φ. If such a model exists, then we can take Pr(I) = 1 and this will
make the probabilistic formula satisfiable. This is an effective algorithm, therefore
probabilistic satisfiability is decidable.
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Theorem 2. The satisfiability of a knowledge base is decidable.
Proof. A knowledge base K is given, containing probabilistic formulas Fi of the
form φi ≥ li. This time we have a set of probabilistic formulas (as opposed to just
one in the previous theorem) and we are searching for a Pr function satisfying all
of them.
Let us look at the matrix representation of the probability of events.
WP = Π∑
w1jPr(Ij) = Pr(φ1) ≥ l1∑
w2jPr(Ij) = Pr(φ2) ≥ l2
...∑
wijPr(Ij) = Pr(φi) ≥ li
...∑
wnjPr(Ij) = Pr(φn) ≥ ln
where wij ∈ {0, 1}, Pr(x) ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
Pr(Ij) = 1, i = 1..n, j = 1..m.
Since a system of linear inequalities is decidable (see below), we can conclude
that the satisfiability of a probabilistic knowledge base is decidable. Since a
knowledge base is a set of logical sentences with given probabilities, there is a
one-to-one correspondence between the knowledge base and the above system of
linear inequalities. From this it follows that the probabilistic knowledge base is
satisfiable if and only if the system of linear inequalities is solvable.
Determining the feasibility of a system of linear inequalities is part of one
of the most extensively studied problems in Computer Science called linear pro-
gramming. The purpose of linear programming is to find an optimal solution to a
function where the linear inequalities serve as constraints on this function. There
are numerical methods of solving the linear programming problem, which start
with a first phase of finding an initial feasible solution to the linear inequalities
(Vanderbei, 2008). It has been proven that this Phase I has the same complex-
ity as the whole linear programming problem (Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 1998,
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p.172). The most efficient algorithm currently existing is the ellipsoid algorithm
which has polynomial complexity (Papadimitriou and Steiglitz, 1998, chap. 8.7).
2.3 Probability interpretations
This section deals with the question whether probability is an objective quantity
that we can try to approximate, or a subjective value. Over time several scientists
and philosophers have come up with as many as five distinct probability interpre-
tations. The one thing everyone agrees on is that any probability calculus has to
adhere to Kolmogorov’s axioms: Let Ω be a non-empty set, F a sigma-algebra4
on Ω, and P a function from F to the real numbers such that:
• P (A) ≥ 0 for all A ∈ F , i.e. a probability is a non-negative real number;
• P (Ω) = 1, i.e. the probability of the entire sample space is 1;
• P (A ∪ B) = P (A) + P (B) for all A,B ∈ F such that A ∩ B = ∅, i.e.
the probability of the union of mutually exclusive events is the sum of the
probability of each event.
So far any normalized measure, such as relative weight or relative length, fulfils
these axioms but that does not make them probability interpretations. Salmon
(1967) believes a number of additional criteria need to be satisfied in order to
make a probability interpretation acceptable. In Salmon (1967, p.63) he specifies
three such criteria:
• Admissibility: An interpretation is called admissible “if the meanings as-
signed to the primitive terms transform the formal axioms, and consequently
all the theorems into true statements.” This means that some axioms of
probability calculus have to apply. Salmon uses Reichenbach’s axioms
(Salmon, 1967, p.58), although Kolmogorov published his version of the
probability calculus two years before Reichenbach. Today, Kolmogorov’s
4A sigma-algebra over a set X is a nonempty collection of subsets of X (including X itself) that
is closed under complementation and countable unions of its members.
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axioms are universal, and synonymous with “probability calculus.” Re-
ichenbach’s axioms are more complicated and can all be deduced from Kol-
mogorov’s.5 This criterion does not say anything specific about probability,
indeed, any formal theory has to adhere to some axioms. It is nonetheless
an important criterion that some interpretations do not meet (such as some
subjective agents, or propensities, see below).
• Ascertainability: There should be “some method by which, in principle at
least, we can ascertain values of probabilities.” In this criterion Salmon
expresses his wish that the probability values should be able to be “found
out.” If we believe Niels Bohr, then probabilities are real numbers that we
can only approximate. Perhaps the real criterion should be that the interpre-
tation in question should provide a method with which we can approximate
probabilities rather than “ascertain” them.
• Applicability: As Salmon quotes Bishop Butler, “Probability is the very
guide of life.” We are looking for a concept of probability “that will have
practical predictive significance.” For instance, it should guide us in placing
bets on events, or it should help us make forecasts. This latter criterion is the
vaguest so far and, indeed, Achinstein (1969) argues that it allows mathe-
matically valid theories which have no relation to the everyday usage of the
word “probability.” As a counter-argument, Achinstein imagines a probabil-
ity calculus where every probability value would be the individual’s relative
mass in the set of all individuals (Achinstein, 1969, p.532). This roughly fits
Salmon’s criteria and it might even serve as a suitable measure for probabil-
ity in some very specific situations, but it would clearly not be an adequate
interpretation for probability in general. Therefore, Achinstein argues, we
might add a fourth criterion which is simply that a probability interpretation
should have some connection to the intuitive meaning of probability.
5See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reichenbach/ section 2.3.
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The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy specifies five main probability interpre-
tations:6
1. Classical
Every outcome has the same probability. The probability is calculated by taking
the number of favourable outcomes divided by the number of all possible out-
comes. The problem with this interpretation is that we assume that every outcome
is equally probable. This makes it adequate for some situations (such as throwing
dice and other gambling examples), but it makes it difficult to consider scenarios
when we know that the outcomes are not equally probable, such as the loaded die,
and it is clearly impossible to deal with infinite or continuous sample spaces or
singular events.
2. Frequency
There are two ways of looking at this interpretation. One way is if we have a
domain and sample its contents, and note frequencies of occurrences of whatever
property we are interested in. The other alternative is to repeat an experiment
as long as we possibly can and count the occurrences of specific events. The
probability is the limit of the relative frequency of the favourable occurrences (to
the size of the sample, or the number of experiments).
The main questions we can raise are: can we be certain that the limit of the
relative frequency is the probability, and how can we even find this limit. This
interpretation is suitable for statistical problems, however, it still cannot deal with
single cases (unrepeatable events such as the probability of Fido being a dog).
An interesting type of problem arising in this interpretation is the reference
class problem. This is a very common problem which turns up even in court-
rooms. The issue is about an individual belonging to several classes (or concepts)
where there is no information about the intersection of these classes. When we
are interested in the probability of a property of this individual, all we have are
conditional probabilities for these different concepts. The question is: which one
to use? It is better to illustrate this with an example: we know that tropical berries
6See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/probability-interpret/
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are poisonous with probability p, red berries are poisonous with probability q, so
what can we say about the toxicity of a specific tropical red berry? Shall we label
it as tropical or red? See Ha´jek (2007) for more on the reference class problem.
3. Logical
The probabilistic logic in section 2.2 is based on this interpretation. It was Carnap
who introduced this interpretation in his 1962 work Logical Foundations of Prob-
ability. Some people refer to this interpretation as the degree of belief, however,
it is not the same as subjective probability. Salmon (1967, p.68) calls it the degree
of rational belief or degree of confirmation. This interpretation takes a hypothe-
sis H , and defines its probability given evidence E. This is usually denoted with
p(H|E).
This interpretation expresses inductive reasoning. While deductive reasoning
entails a conclusion from such premises that make it impossible that the conclu-
sion is not true, inductive reasoning goes from evidence to hypothesis, where the
hypothesis is not necessarily warranted from the evidence. An example for deduc-
tive reasoning is: 1) all men are mortal; 2) Socrates is a man; 3) therefore Socrates
is mortal. An illustration of inductive logic is the following: 1) the alarm went off
in your house; 2) therefore your house is probably being burgled. Note that the
possibility of a false alarm makes the conclusion only probable and not necessary.
What we are looking for in this example is P (burglary|alarm).
There is no universal guide for how to determine this probability other than by
giving weights to the possibilities (the possible worlds) which makes this inter-
pretation a (rationally) subjective one. Lutz and Schro¨der (2010) describes their
probabilistic description logic as subjective, although their semantics is based on
possible worlds. Even though there are no rules for how to determine the prob-
abilities of the possible worlds, there are suggestions, for instance, Carnap rec-
ommends an equal distribution among equivalent worlds (which only differ in the
names of the variables) (Carnap, 1962).
Salmon criticizes this interpretation for not fulfilling the applicability criterion,
however, I feel that this interpretation is the best one so far to express single case
probabilities.
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4. Subjective
The logical and the subjective interpretations are often both referred to as degree of
belief. In the subjective interpretation a rational agent determines the probability
values such that different agents may assign different probabilities, or even the
same agent might assign different probabilities at different times. The agent may
decide to base his probabilities on experts’ opinions or relative frequencies.
For this interpretation imagine the probability of your house being burgled
right now. This is an everyday use of the word “probability” when there is a lack
of information about something. When you say “my house could probably be
broken into right now”, you are giving voice to your lack of knowledge of the
fact. You could calculate an approximate probability from factors such as whether
your alarm went off, what the neighbours say, what the crime statistics for your
neighbourhood are. Let’s say you arrive at a conclusion that your house is being
burgled right now with a probability of 0.1. This number is not a frequency but
rather the measure of your educated guess, or in other words the degree of your
belief. This number could be biased to the higher if you have heard about another
house having recently been burgled in your neighbourhood.
The main problem with entirely subjective probabilities is that most subjects
usually cannot separate their beliefs and desires, and they would also assign a
larger probability to events which are easier to imagine or remember. As an
example, imagine that when in roulette there were a large number of reds, the
gambler might believe that there is now a higher chance of getting a black. Hu-
mans show such bias in their judgments about probabilities, see Tversky and Kah-
neman (1974) for an account of several psychological experiments in this topic.
In my opinion, this interpretation fails to satisfy at least two of Salmon’s cri-
teria. Since there is no algorithm for acquiring the probability values, it fails to be
ascertainable. It struggles with applicability as well, since there is no guarantee
that an agent will assign a higher probability to events that are more frequent. As
for admissibility, we can only hope that an agent is rational enough to adhere to
the axioms of probability theory.
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5. Propensity
Propensity is some physical tendency, or chance. It is some inherent (physical)
property of the event in question, something to explain why events with higher
probability are more frequent. An experiment has the propensity p of producing a
certain outcome. The biggest challenge for the advocates of this interpretation is
to define what “propensity” actually means. This interpretation is the most irrel-
evant for this thesis, therefore the interested reader is referred to the Probability
Interpretations article in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
It is clear from the above that no interpretation of probability is perfect, and in the
end it seems like a sort of combination of them is in order. As an example, take the
probability that Joe is blue-eyed. You, as an agent, can ascertain this probability
by first measuring the frequency of blue-eyed people, and then updating this with
additional (perhaps probabilistic) knowledge, for instance the eye colour of Joe’s
parents.
The probabilistic description logic discussed in the following chapters will
mainly use two interpretations: the frequency and the logical probabilities. The
latter will be referred to as the degree-of-belief interpretation.
3 Probabilistic Description Logics
Now that we have learned all about the basics, we can look at probabilities in
description logics.
In probabilistic description logics it is more apparent than in propositional
logic that probability has more than one interpretation. Since description logic
makes use of sets, we can ask questions about the frequency of certain occur-
rences in these sets. Take for example the concept “Birds”. We could consider for
instance the probability of a random bird being able to fly. To calculate this, we
only have to sample the elements of the Bird concept, and measure the relative
frequency of the flying birds.
Secondly, we have subjective probabilities (or degrees of belief). Given a
probabilistic formula “P (φ) = p”, φ can represent any logical sentence that has a
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distinct true or false value. In description logics such sentences can be for instance
terminological axioms or assertions. In case of probabilistic assertions, such as
P (“Tweety is a bird”) it is clear that we cannot talk about frequencies, and indeed
all the sources agree that assertions always have a belief-type probability. In the
following we will concentrate on probabilistic terminological knowledge, since it
is there that both the frequency and the degree-of-belief interpretations make an
appearance.
If we look at the most important papers on probabilistic description logics we
find a few different types of formalisms. Fagin et al. (1990) and Koller et al.
(1997) use Bayesian networks to reason with concrete probability distributions.
Heinsohn (1994), Jaeger (1994) and Lukasiewicz (2008) use conditional probabil-
ities to express statistical information. The latter two also allow degrees of belief
for probabilistic assertions. Lukasiewicz also uses non-monotonic logic such as
default logic in their reasoning methods. Du¨rig and Studer (2005) and Lutz and
Schro¨der (2010) only deal with subjective probabilities in ABoxes, and Tao et al.
(2007) is so far the only undertaking to use degree-of-belief type probabilities in
both TBox and ABox. Before we endeavour to understand their semantics, let us
take a short look at conditional probabilities in description logics.
3.1 Frequency model
The frequency model is used by most researchers (such as Lukasiewicz (2008),
Straccia (2008), Jaeger (1994), Heinsohn (1994)). They all use conditional prob-
abilities to deal with probabilistic terminological knowledge. For better compre-
hension the following section uses a simplified notation based on both Lukasiewicz
and Straccia (2008) and Jaeger (1994).
If we have φ andψ logical expressions, then the conditional probability P (φ |ψ)
is defined as:
P (φ | ψ) =

P (φ ∧ ψ)
P (ψ)
if P (ψ) 6= 0
1 otherwise
In description logics a logical expression can be either a terminological expression
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about elements in general, or an assertion about a specific individual. For instance
P (x : C | x : D), where x is an individual and C and D are concepts, is about a
randomly chosen individual x, therefore it is a terminological statement.
P (a : C | a : D) is about a specific individual a. These formulas are usually
abbreviated to P (C | D) and put in either the TBox or the ABox to indicate
whether it is a general statement or a specific one.
If we have a finite domain, then probabilistic terminological statements can be
evaluated by considering every element in the concepts in question. In this case
we can rewrite the formula as follows:
P (C | D) =

|(CI ∩DI)|
|DI | if |D
I | 6= 0
1 otherwise
(1)
where | · · · | denotes the size of a finite set. If the domain is infinite, then the above
formula can be used on a sample.
The meaning of a probabilistic formula depends on whether it is in the TBox
or the ABox:7
• In the TBox each formula P (C | D) = p encodes that if an individual
belongs to D, then it belongs to C with a probability of p.
• In the ABox, the formula P (a : C | a : D) = q encodes that if a belongs to
D, then a belongs to C with a probability of q.
These two definitions look very similar, however, the first one is a frequency and
the second one is a logical probability or degree of belief.
Non-conditional probabilities can be expressed with “given true” such as (C|>),
e.g. the probability that a randomly selected individual is a bird is denoted by
P (bird |>). (Note that Lukasiewicz and Straccia (2008) do not use one probabil-
ity value, but an interval of probabilities with lower and upper bounds. In spite of
this being practically useful, this is not directly relevant for this thesis.)
Lukasiewicz and Straccia (2008) argue that any description logic can be ex-
tended with probabilistic logic, and furthermore, if the chosen DL is decidable
7Lukasiewicz and Straccia (2008) define an additional PT-box for probabilistic terminological
statements, and one PA-box for each individual with probabilistic assertions.
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for knowledge base satisfiability, then its probabilistic extension will be decidable
as well for the main probabilistic reasoning tasks. In the most basic description
logic, ALC, satisfiability is decidable.8
3.2 Belief model
The article PrDLs: A New Kind of Probabilistic Description Logics About Belief
by Tao et al. (2007) is unique in its field since its authors are the only ones using
the degree-of-belief approach for terminological axioms. Their aim is to create a
probabilistic version of the description logic tableau calculus, which is a reasoning
algorithm mainly designed for satisfiability checking. This thesis is not concerned
with the details of this tableau algorithm, only the main specifications of their
theory.
They introduce (t)α where t is a DL axiom, α ∈ [0, 1] and which means that
α is the probability of t being true. For example if we have (C v D)0.8, then the
probability of concept C being a subset of concept D is 0.8. If α = 1, then the
statement can be abbreviated to C v D, which Tao et al. call a certain axiom.
A DL axiom can be terminological or assertional. Terminological axioms,
moreover, can involve either concepts or roles. This defines a triple <C, R, A>
(where they call C the CBox and R the RBox) which constitutes the knowledge
base. Each Cbox can be further divided into Cd and Cp, where Cd contains the
certain concept axioms and Cp contains the probabilistic ones. The Rbox and
Abox can be divided similarly. Tao et al., moreover, define a certain extension to
Cp (andRp andAp respectively) denoted with Cpe (andRpe andApe) where every
probabilistic axiom (t)α is substituted with (t).
3.2.1 Semantics
As it was introduced in section 2.1.1 (page 5), the semantics of any DL is based
on interpretations. An interpretation (or model) consists of a domain and a func-
tion which maps individuals to members of this domain and concepts to subsets
of the domain. We can talk about an interpretation satisfying a concept, if that
concept is nonempty in that model. An interpretation can satisfy a terminological
8In particular it has PSPACE (polynomial space) complexity (Baader et al., 2003, p.114).
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or assertional axiom, if the interpretation of that axiom is true in the model, and,
finally, an interpretation satisfies a knowledge base, if it satisfies all of its axioms.
Tao et al. define satisfiability for probabilistic terms. They say an interpreta-
tion I satisfies a probabilistic term (t)α if I satisfies its certain extension (t). An
interpretation possibly satisfies a probabilistic knowledge base if it satisfies all the
certain axioms in it.
We have a probabilistic knowledge base K = 〈C,R,A〉 with Cd, Rd and Ad
being their certain parts, and Cp, Rp and Ap the probabilistic parts with Cpe, Rpe
and Ape their certain extensions. Then we define a set of knowledge bases DK
that are related to K to be all the knowledge bases containing Cd,Rd and Ad, and
some of the axioms of Cpe,Rpe and Ape.
DK =
{〈Cd ∪ Ci,Rd ∪Ri,Ad ∪ Ai〉 ∣∣ Ci ⊆ Cpe ∧Ri ⊆ Rpe ∧ Ai ⊆ Ape}
These knowledge bases are all non-probabilistic. Clearly, all the interpretations
that satisfy any of these knowledge bases in DK will “possibly satisfy” our prob-
abilistic knowledge base K since they satisfy the certain axioms in K. The set of
all these interpretations isWK, also called the set of possible worlds.
WK =
{
w
∣∣ ∃K ∈ DK : w |= K}
Tao et al. define a probability structure onWK denoted by M = (WK, µ) where µ
is defined as a “discrete probability distribution”. From the following it is apparent
that µ has to assign a probability to each singleton {w}. This kind of probability
space is called a point probability distribution, and for such a function it is true
that µ(∪w∈A{w}) =
∑
w∈A µ({w}) where A is some subset ofWK.
The probability of a term t in the knowledge base is defined as the probability
of the union of those worlds which model those knowledge bases in DK which
contain t.
µ(t) = µ(
⋃
Kd∈DK ∧ w|=Kd ∧ Kd|=t
{w})
The complexity of this formula appears unnecessary. It is known whether a log-
ical term is satisfiable in an interpretation; for the purposes of this formula it is
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unnecessary to use the related knowledge bases of DK. Thus we can rewrite the
above formula as:
µ(t) = µ(
⋃
w|=t
{w})
This is the same result as we got with probabilistic propositional logic, namely
that the probability of a logical statement is the sum of the probabilities of those
worlds in which the statement is true. However, the definition of a possible world
is slightly different. Nilsson (1986) defines a possible world as an assignment of
truth values to the logical sentences. For instance, in the case of two sentences t1
and t2, our possible worlds would be:
w1 = {t1, t2}
w2 = {t1,¬t2}
w3 = {¬t1, t2}
w4 = {¬t1,¬t2}
These do not correspond to the interpretations, which are mappings of the symbols
to the semantic entities. It was Bacchus (1990) who first noted this nonequivalence
in relation to probabilistic first-order logic. There can be an infinite amount of
interpretations resulting in the same truth value assignment.
The next definition in Tao et al. (2007, p.647) concerns the probability of
concept satisfiability.
µ(C) = 1− µ(
⋃
Kd∈DK ∧ w|=Kd ∧ Kd 6|=C
{w}) (2)
where Kd 6|= C is defined by Tao et al. to mean that C is not satisfiable with
respect to the knowledge base Kd. Tao et al. do not explain anything further about
this formula, so I will attempt to fill in the blanks here. I am, moreover, curious
whether this formula could be rewritten without the “1−” in the beginning.
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3.2.2 Probability of concept satisfiability
As an example, let K1 be a related knowledge base to the probabilistic knowledge
base K. Let K1 = {A v B,C v A u ¬B}. Here C is unsatisfiable because it
is empty in every model of this knowledge base. In formula 2 we discard exactly
these models, and consider only those which are not models of knowledge bases
where C is unsatisfiable. To help the reader understand this, consider Figure 1.
Figure 1
This rectangle represents the set of all possible worlds. The Ki are all the
related knowledge bases to K. Each set denoted with |= Ki is the set of all those
possible worlds which model Ki. The knowledge bases K1 and K4 are those in
whichC is unsatisfiable. It is evident that the models of different knowledge bases
may overlap. Formula 2 includes those worlds which are in the yellow areas in
Figure 1. Since one world may model several knowledge bases, we cannot rewrite
formula 2 to include instead those knowledge bases where C is satisfiable, which
can be denoted with µ(C):
µ(C) = µ(
⋃
Kd∈DK ∧ w|=Kd ∧ Kd|=C
{w}) (3)
This would clearly include different models than the first formula, see the yellow
areas in Figure 2. Therefore we can conclude that µ(C) 6= µ(C).
I find neither of the two formulas suitable. Concept satisfiability is a notion
connected with knowledge bases; you cannot talk about concept satisfiability in
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Figure 2
just one interpretation. Therefore I suggest a new way of defining this probability.
For this we have to define the probability of a knowledge base. This can be done
simply: the probability of a knowledge base is the probability of the union of those
worlds that model it.
µ(K) = µ(
⋃
w|=K
{w})
To find the probability of concept C being satisfiable, one has to add the probabil-
ities of those knowledge bases where C is satisfiable, and weigh it with the sum of
the probabilities of all the knowledge bases in DK (which is likely different from
1 because of the possibility that one world models multiple knowledge bases).
µ̂(C) =
∑
Ki|=C
µ(Ki)
/ ∑
Kj∈DK
µ(Kj)
This will produce an outcome illustrated in Figure 3. In my opinion µ̂(C) would
better grasp the probability of concept satisfiability because it calculates the prob-
abilities of knowledge bases. Concept satisfiability is related to a knowledge base
and not possible worlds. Tao et al.’s formula of µ(C) excludes all those possible
worlds where CI is definitely an empty set, even though these worlds can model
knowledge bases where C is satisfiable.
The aim of the Tao et al. article is to prove that the probability value they get
with their probabilistic tableau method is the same as what they defined in µ(C).
Perhaps their motivation for choosing µ(C) over µ̂(C) was a simpler algorithm.
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Figure 3
On a side note, let us look at what a possible world is, and what it means for
the probability distribution: a possible world is a model, which is an interpreta-
tion. An interpretation consists of a domain and a function: I = {∆I , ·I}, where
∆I is the domain, and the dot represents the interpretation function which maps
individuals to elements of ∆I , and concepts to subsets of ∆I .
It would make sense to keep the domain constant, and then there are only
finitely many permutations of the individuals among the concepts, and thus, a
finite number of possible worlds. But, since mathematically we have no assump-
tions about the cardinality of the domain, there might be an infinite number of
possible worlds. This infinity might even be uncountable, and the probability dis-
tribution on an uncountable set of possible worlds would have to be continuous,
therefore making it impossible to have point probabilities. (The reason is that an
uncountably infinite amount of positive numbers cannot add up to a finite num-
ber.) So the only way we can have point probabilities is if we keep the domain
constant, or if we restrict ourselves to finite domains, or restrict ourselves to a
finite (or countably infinite) subset of all the domains (as in the example below).
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If we do not have point probabilities, then we cannot calculate the probability
of an arbitrary union of possible worlds. In a continuous probability distribution
every point has zero probability, whereas the sum of the probabilities on an inter-
val can be positive, which, in other words, means that the probability of an event
is not carried by its points.
For the purposes of this project it is enough to consider countably infinite
possible worlds. The example below considers only a finite subset of countably
many possible worlds.
3.2.3 Example
This is an explanation of the example in Tao et al. (2007, p.647). We are given a
probabilistic knowledge base K with two terminological axioms:
K =
{
(Animal v Creature uMovableThing)0.8,
(Mammal v Animal u FourLegThing)0.9
}
A possible worlds distribution is given in M1 = (W , µ), and the following four
interpretations are given. The domain is not strictly speaking fixed here, but only
four worlds are given as having positive probabilities.9
µ(w1) = 0.05 : ∆
w1 = {a, b, c},Creaturew1 = {a, b, c},MovableThingw1 = {a, b},
Animalw1 = {a},FourLegThingw1 = {c},Mammalw1 = {a}
µ(w2) = 0.75 : ∆
w2 = {a, b, c},Creaturew2 = {a, b, c},MovableThingw2 = {a, b},
Animalw2 = {a},FourLegThingw2 = {a},Mammalw2 = {a}
µ(w3) = 0.15 : ∆
w3 = {a, b, c},Creaturew3 = {a, b, c},MovableThingw3 = {a, b},
Animalw3 = {b, c},FourLegThingw3 = {b},Mammalw3 = {b}
µ(w4) = 0.05 : ∆
w4 = {a, b, c},Creaturew4 = {a, b, c},MovableThingw4 = {a, b},
Animalw4 = {b, c},FourLegThingw4 = {b},Mammalw4 = {c}
µ(wk) = 0.00 : wk ∈ WK ∧ k 6= 1, 2, 3, 4
9In the original paper Tao et al. introduce P (I) which we can assume means µ(w) and which
was most likely only a mistype since µ means probability, and w is an interpretation. Here we will
use µ(w). All other namings are kept unchanged.
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What is not entirely clear from the text is why the probability values are given in
both the knowledge base and the probability distribution. What if the given values
do not match? The likely explanation is that only one of them is given, and it is
our task to find the other. Or, as in Section 2.2.1, our task is to find out if the
specified probability distribution satisfies the knowledge base.
Figure 4
Figure 4 (page 30) shows a graphical representation of the four worlds in the
example. The concepts are abbreviated: C = Creature, Mt = MovableThing, A =
Animal, Flt = FourLegThing and M = Mammal. To test whether this distribution
satisfies the given knowledge base, we have to find those worlds where each of
the axioms are true.
The first axiom Animal v Creature uMovableThing is clearly true in worlds
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1 and 2, therefore its probability should be µ(w1 ∪ w2) = µ(w1) + µ(w2) =
0.05+0.75 = 0.8. The probability of the second axiom can be calculated the same
way, and indeed, we get the same probabilities as were given in the knowledge
base. This shows that M1 satisfies K.
Unfortunately, Tao et al.’s incomplete information in their comments about
this example (such as mentioning the concept “Human”, which is not included in
the knowledge base of the example, therefore it must only be there by mistake)
make it rather difficult to understand their remarks, so the readers can only hope
that they are not missing anything important.
4 Analysis
This section is meant to compare the work of Tao et al. with other results in prob-
abilistic description logics. It is an analysis of the difference between the belief
and frequency interpretations of probability in connection with description logics.
I seek an answer to the question of whether the belief model has any advantages
over the more common conditional probability.
Klinov et al. (2009) argues that it is important to find a correspondence be-
tween frequency and belief type probabilities, because they are often used along-
side each other in the same formalism (frequency used for terminologies and belief
used for assertions). The former assumes one world and the probability distribu-
tion is on the domain (usually giving equal weight to each member), while the
latter is about multiple possible worlds and the probabilities are given to these
worlds instead of the domain. It is not straightforward whether it is possible to
use the two interpretations in one formalism. Halpern (1990) combines the two
interpretations by giving probabilities to the frequency values such as (P (C|D))α,
where α is calculated from the possible worlds. I propose a similar method in sec-
tion 4.3.
In sections 4.1 and 4.2, I compare the frequency and belief interpretations of
probability. Since there is no conditional probability in the belief model, the best
idea seems to be to compare it to concept subsumption, and that is what I will do
in this analysis.
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4.1 Comparison of the frequency and belief models
Let us look at an example where the frequency and belief values are the same, to
make the comparison more transparent. Let us take P (A|B) = P (B v A) = 0.6
and P (B|A) = P (A v B) = 0.3. Figures 5 and 6 show the two cases. In
Figure 5 we can see the individuals in the concepts A and B; this arrangement
is the exact sample space which we are using to reason about the real concepts.
Figure 6 shows some possible worlds with their respective probabilities. We can
see that the interpretation is quite different since there is only one world in the first
case, and several possible worlds in the second case.
Figure 5: Frequency interpretation.
Figure 6: Possible worlds.
If we take degree of belief values as logical probabilities (see page 18 on the
logical probability interpretation), then the only way to interpret them is with pos-
sible worlds, and indeed, that is what Tao et al. do in their article. This results in a
formalism which can never express the degree with which two concepts intersect
each other. This is a characteristic of classical description logics which gives the
advantage to the belief interpretation as being a very straightforward extension of
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the non-probabilistic case, but it is also a disadvantage if our aim is to express
something new as the frequency interpretation does.
Conditional probabilities can tell us something new for instance when we
know that one concept is included in the other but do not know how much the
smaller concept exhausts the other. In Figure 7 the conditional probability P (C|D)
would be considerably smaller in the first case than in the second.
Figure 7
4.2 Implication
We saw from the previous example that the two interpretations are virtually im-
possible to compare because of the existence of multiple possible worlds in one
interpretation and only one world in the other. Perhaps the notion of implication
can help us compare the two formalisms in a more meaningful way.
In set theory it is defined that a set A is a subset of B if and only if every
element of A is also an element of B. In probability theory we can talk about the
probability of A being a subset of B by sampling random elements in the domain.
There is a fundamental difference in how this is actually worded in the frequency
and belief interpretations. The belief model states: the probability that if a random
element is in C, then it is also in D, is p. The frequency model, however, states:
if a random element is in C, then the probability that it is also in D, is q.
Belief model: P
(
(a : C)→ (a : D)
)
= p
Frequency model: (a : C)→
(
P (a : D) = q
)
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The truth table assignments can be seen in Table 2. In the conditional probability
case we are not interested in the premise being false.
Belief model:
(a : C → a : D)p
T + T
T - F
F + T
F + F
Frequency model:
a : C → (a : D)q
T + T
T - F
Table 2: Truth value assignments
Conditional probabilities are far more useful, because in the belief-case we
include a lot of extra cases for instance when a is not in C and not in D either.
In the belief case, we are looking for the answer to “what is the probability
of C implying D?” Then we sample the whole domain for individuals, and see
whether they are part of C and D, or C but not D, or D but not C, or neither C
nor D. According to the frequency model of probability, we then add the number
of cases for when the implication is true (i.e. when the individual selected is in
both C and D, or not C but D, or neither C nor D), and then divide it with the
number of all the cases (which includes also the case when it is C but not D). As
an example let’s say we are looking for the answer to “what is the probability that
all members of Bird are also members of FlyingThing”. In the conditional proba-
bility case we would get say 80% probability that an individual is a FlyingThing
given it is a Bird, which means there would be some individuals that are Birds
but not FlyingThings (see Figure 8b). In the belief-case, we would get a large
number of extra individuals that are not Birds and not FlyingThings which would
make the implication valid, but at the same time not contributing with any useful
information. We would get that perhaps it is 95% probable that Bird is a subset of
FlyingThing (see Figure 8a).
This model removes the possible worlds and uses a frequency interpretation on
concept subsumption. This shows how it is possible to transform degree-of-belief
type terminological knowledge to frequencies.
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Figure 8: Birds (B) and FlyingThings (FT)
4.3 Going from possible worlds to frequencies
While it is simple to think of belief type terminological knowledge as frequency
information, it is possible that we are not given the required value in the knowl-
edge base. Is it possible to acquire frequency information from a possible worlds
distribution?
Let us take the example detailed in section 3.2.3 (page 29). Our aim in this
exercise is to find a way to express conditional probabilities such as:
P (Animal|MovingThing)
This value is not given in the knowledge base, but other information is. From
this information we can construct a possible worlds distribution and use this to
compute the above conditional probability.
Usually we would count the members of the intersection of the Animal and
Moving Thing concepts, then divide this with the number of elements in the Mov-
ing Thing set. Now, however, the individuals of the domain are only probably
members of a concept. Luckily, we know this probability: it is the probability of
the union of those worlds where the individual is in the concept. We can take this
probability as the weight of the individual with respect to the concept in question.
When counting the individuals in a concept (or sample set), instead of adding one
for each individual, I propose to add the weight of each element in the set.
Going back to the example on page 29, let us find out the probability of
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P (Animal|MovingThing).
P (a ∈ Mt) = 1 P (b ∈ Mt) = 1 P (c ∈ Mt) = 0
P (a ∈ A ∩Mt) = 0.8 P (b ∈ A ∩Mt) = 0.2 P (c ∈ A ∩Mt) = 0
Equation 1 (page 22) gives us the formula to calculate the conditional probability:
P (A|Mt) = |A ∩Mt||Mt| =
0.8 + 0.2
1 + 1
=
1
2
This method essentially uses the same frequency interpretation as before, except
in this case there is a probability distribution on the domain which gives unequal
weights to each element in relation to a concept. The weight of an element in
relation to the whole domain is still 1.
5 Conclusion
Throughout this thesis multiple objectives were achieved. Firstly, some important
theorems were proven about the decidability of probabilistic logic. Secondly, sev-
eral probability interpretations were analyzed with regard to how they fulfil certain
criteria. It was concluded that it is essential to have multiple different interpreta-
tions since there is no interpretation which can combine all aspects of probability,
and it is common practice in probabilistic description logics to combine at least
two interpretations – the frequency and the degree of belief ones.
The Tao et al. (2007) paper is unique in its usage of the belief-model with
regard to terminological axioms. One would assume that their motivations were
purely theoretical and not practical. In other practically oriented papers the fre-
quency model is used for the TBoxes with no exceptions.
The Tao et al. article deals with an interesting topic but the paper is lacking
precision, and has not been published in a mainstream description logic journal.
I attempted, and hopefully succeeded in, filling in the gaps of the explanations
in this article and making it more accessible to my fellow students. I believe the
alternative µ̂(C) formula for the probability of concept satisfiability is a demon-
stration of my complete understanding of the subject.
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One advantage of the Tao et al. approach is that there is only one type of
probability on both terminologies and assertions, therefore there is no ambiguity
of having more than one probability interpretation and no question of how to make
two such different interpretations work together.
Lutz and Schro¨der (2010) aims to investigate probabilistic TBox statements
further. Their aim seems to be to create a theoretically interesting semantics rather
than a practically useful one. Their claim is we should fully understand the be-
haviour of probabilistic DLs before we venture into non-monotonic logic or other
difficult formalisms, and they believe that a uniform probability interpretation on
both TBoxes and ABoxes can help them with that aim.
Statistical information is abundant in the world, and this information cannot be
expressed in a semantics based solely on possible worlds. A formalism expressing
several different uncertainties has to essentially combine different formal models
for the different probability interpretations. From a practical point of view, a for-
malism which assigns probabilities to logical sentences is limited in its not being
able to express statistical information. While statistical information is aplenty
and easy to obtain with experiments and observation, a probability distribution on
possible worlds is mostly subjective.
The logical probability interpretation gives us a rigorous framework for deal-
ing with subjective probabilities, however, they remain subjective. As long as
there are methods for combining frequencies with beliefs (such as Halpern (1990),
and the method suggested by myself in section 4.3), there is no practical reason
to abandon the frequency interpretation in favour of subjective probabilities in the
TBox.
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